









In the Muddy Center: A Physics of Nonpropositional Thinking


The Sound of Thinking Metal


In a work of philosophy that unearths an unorthodox line of innovation and problem construction at the juncture between physics and mathematics, Gilles Châtelet gave expression to an intellectual antagonism against the contemporary status that is conceded to traditional philosophical and scientific problems. He showed a particular uneasiness around what could be called the ''naturalization'' of thought. A most topical example of this naturalization is of course the claim of the neurosciences to exhaustively explain the power and genesis of thought—artistic, scientific and philosophical— on the basis of an extensive knowledge of the nervous system and the relationship it entertains to its social and biological milieus. Not mincing his words, and in a way that has been noted by at least one scientist of the brain (Alain Berthoz), Châtelet mentioned ''the neuronal barbarism which exhausts itself in hunting down the recipient of the thought and in confusing learning with a pillaging of informational booty.'' Instead, he suggested, the German idealist philosopher ''Schelling perhaps saw more clearly: he knew that thought was not always encapsulated within the brain, that it could be everywhere ... outside ... in the morning dew''.​[1]​ 

Fearing neural reductionism, one can go too far in undermining the wonderful organ that is the brain. However, in Châtelet's particular take on the tradition of Naturphilosophie there is also a prescient resonance for what one could call a resurgent metaphysics of non-propositional thought, that reexplores and brings fresh provocations to a whole spectrum of relations between the physical, biological and the mental, opening to new negotiation supposedly familiar positions like panpsychism, organicism and a more recent category like biocentrism. In a tentative generalization, one could characterize the nonpropositional as a backlash from Naturphilosophie against a restricted form of ''naturalization'' in the image of neural correlates approaches. At least a revaluation of what would only be a ''peripheral'' system according to neural correlates approaches, is a natural consequence of the nonpropositional, which is likelier to consider thought, and not only thought but also ''language as an infinite museum whose center is everywhere and whose limits are nowhere'' (Smithson 78).​[2]​ 

To be clear, what this useful category —the ''nonpropositional''— captures are the various forms of the extension which makes abstract entities such as truth, method, knowledge, understanding, logical processes, criticism, measurement, hypotheses, or thought in short, a matter of events and objects whose primarily unthinking and extra-logical nature is generally considered to be unproblematic: eating, moving, growing, acting, metabolisms, rock formations. What is at stake is a massive revision of the common dismissal of this second group into mere immediacy, and their subordination to the exlusive reflectivity and representational savviness of human thought, when thinking is a question. 

That breathing can be an ancestral or nonpropositional form of a logical affirmation might perhaps be an intuitive assertion, but it is not necessarily self-evident.​[3]​ A different version of the same claim has found scope in Eugene Thacker's analyses of life forms such as extremophiles, organisms that are adapted to survive and flourish in extreme conditions and environments (''extreme heat, cold, acidity, pressure, radioactivity...''). In a particularly attracting invitation to the problems this study aims to lay out, Thacker characterizes these species as ''examples of living contradictions, a living instance of the inverse relationship between logic and life'' (Thacker). Continuing, we can ask whether one thinks as much by walking and being an organ, or being a metal, or even better, by being an information network, as by ruminating in symbols within the patrimony of human representational thought. Similarly, there may be inborn measurement taking processes which are prior to detectors fabricated by human contrivance. As Ursula Le Guin once wrote, ''thinking is one way of doing, and words are one way of thinking''.​[4]​ Reformulated and given a sharper edge, the question may become, how anything can be thought about the ultimate condition of any anthropomorphism, before any anthropomorphism exists to assimilate it. How can ''thinking metal'' (in the words of William S. Burroughs) be understood to be ''thinking'' without the quotation marks.

The following is an inquiry that seeks out possible responses to these questions in a speculative and natural historical spirit, collecting and sorting arguments like specimens, treating languages and logics like life and material strata, hoping to provide a selective survey and expose the stakes underlying the challenge of these questions.

While today the ''metaphysics''​[5]​ which gives some room to these questions has a particular prominence, helped among other things by a hospitable trend of media-archaeological as well as historical interventions that underline the prolongation of nature into technology and the abiotic into the human— with resultant revaluations of materials in their transmission capacities— it certainly is not so absolutely new that it cannot be said to iterate older questions from the philosophical tradition, beside the main line of Naturphilosophie that inspires Gilles Châtelet.

As it often happens, a likely precursor might be Hegel, who, not being satisfied with the Kantian ban on knowing things in themselves, set out to expose the knowability of—and concurrently the ways of knowing possessed by— what was not immediately amenable to human knowledge, by carrying out his manouevres on the limit, dislodging seemingly stable and impenetrable object positions in a progressive advance by the absolute. With the help of a versatile instrument such as an all encompassing logic of negation, Hegel had no difficulties in attributing a logical valence to an animal approaching its food.

More importantly, as Jean-Luc Nancy wrote, for Hegel, not thinking the ''irruption of the unconditional'' that is the absolute, ''amounts to not doing justice to thought: it is to hold it back from itself—back from the absolute dignity that it posits and from the no less absolute freedom it demands''.​[6]​ Hardly the innocent concept it may seem to be, dignity here is certainly key, as it would be hard to reconcile the nonpropositional, which tends to look toward what humans cannot take credit for, with a vision which takes dignity to be a natural accompaniment or constitutive aspect of thought's supreme human exercise. After all, this is a concept in accord with which ''nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which the autonomous subject has itself to thank'' (Adorno).​[7]​

The non-propositional that accedes to thought today rarely takes the Hegelian trajectory and its human specific dignities, it seems to me, but acknowledged or not, follows a line that is closer to Alfred N. Whitehead's desire to mend what he diagnosed as the modern ''bifurcation of nature'', according to which the exclusive credit given by human subjectivity and mentality to itself about knowledge and thought is only at the expense of a generally incoherent view of nature at large. Foreshadowed by a deservedly influential essay by William James that ushered ''radical empiricism'', Whitehead's perspective aims to show that the relation between consciousness and the things of the world that one has consciousness of is not as straightforward as this bifurcation would lead the moderns to believe, leaving unresolved problems like the status of a matter left for dead, and nature reduced to ''a dull affair, soundless, scentless,  colourless;  merely the  hurrying  of  material, endlessly,  meaninglessly'';​[8]​ and the concomitant difficulty of conceiving how human nature and thought may hail from the same dead matter.

In a more direct way and following from Whitehead's productive engagements with romantic views of nature in Wordsworth and Shelley, the nonpropositional in thought today is perhaps also nourished by a culture of sympathy with other living things, and the earth at large, in the time of their global endangerment by long range consequences of human actions. Felt meanings and ''shared sentience'' are gaining deeper traction, and claim a space in a more expansive vision of ''rationality'' that admits its own blind spots. In that sense a Post-Romantic undercurrent exists in what one may call the contemporary investment in the nonpropositional: "...He believed it must be an endless delight to feel moved by the unique life of each and every form; to have a soul for stones, metals, water and plants; to take in every being in nature into oneself as in a dream, as flowers do with the air at every waxing and waning of the moon'' (Buchner).​[9]​ But instead of being limited to extending the domain of an answer to ''what lives?'' doing the same around the question of ''what thinks?'' is what primarily constitutes the jurisdiction of the nonpropositional, and this is what concerns this particular study.

If an increasingly common point of attraction today across debates in anthropology, literary criticism, and discourse about the anthropocene, is the staging of a problem similar to the Whiteheadian bifurcation, this time it is not in terms of the divide between subject and object, but rather on the level of a difference between propositional and representational thought, epitomized by the directed use of language or logic undertaken by human subjects, and a nonpropositional thought found in extrasubjective and extraconsciousness domains like material and organic relations, ecosystems, plants, landscapes and non-human liaisons at large, which may presumably include the nonhuman in the humans as well. 

This is not only about the external world serving as a scaffolding for limited human cognitive capacities either. The claims made exceed this type of attribution of ''epistemic credit'' to environment, an attribution which remains largely limited to a field of synchronic assemblies between humans and nonhumans. For a ''migration of thought out of the brain'' or a redistribution of credit to happen, the brain must remain a central point of reference in a field of simultaneity, however qualified this status may be. The temporal status of the nonpropositional on the other hand is to be understood not as a limited scaffolding for or coevolution with human thought in a field of simultaneity, but as involving precedence and creative supervenience in a field of successive phases as well. In other words, the nonpropositional seems to go deeper, further back, or laterally farther afield than the adjunct status the extended mind thesis bestows on the world in its rapport with human cognition.

This being so, one cannot say that what is at stake is a decentring of propositional thought or representation. Seeing in the nonpropositional only a form of antihumanist pathos modeled after the antisubjective pathos of yore would not be fair to this phenomenon. Since the various accounts that respond to the rift between the propositional and the nonpropositional in thought reconfigure the conceptions of each respective form of thought; more than a unilateral decentring, a vast recalibration of the lingustic in light of the living as well as abiotic materiality, and a recalibration of the living in the light of the human languages and logics which arose from it would be a more accurate description of the stakes involved. The implications go both ways, and open to scrutiny multiple modes of relation between the propositional and the nonpropositional: grounding, amplification, interruption and (re)enaction, besides the limited and more familiar mediations that are sublation and representation. 

Talking only about a metaphysics would probably be misleading however. Although it is true that certain contemporary philosophical tendencies enjoy a particularly noticeable link with the nonhumans and nonpropositional modes of thought (speculative realist, actor network and so on, to use some handy self-bestowed labels) poetry and literature at large have always served as an inspiration for this rapprochement. From Arthur Conan Doyle's ''When the World Screamed'', where the inorganic strata of the earth declare their vitality  to phenomena like Weird and New Weird which bequeathed numerous scenarios of disorienting rejoinder to human exception, the literary record for fabulations about a thought inherent to supposedly inert and nonliving agents and relations is long and diverse.


Poetic Knowledge From Wallace Stevens' ''Notes toward a Supreme Fiction'' to Gregory Bateson


With regard to poetry in particular, here it is difficult not to agree with Jean Wahl, who thought that ''if there is a metaphysical base, a hypophysical domain...if there is a massive torpor at the root of nature and sometimes at our root, it is precisely there that a junction between poetry and metaphysics can be found''.​[10]​ If there is a massive torpor that is also a ''thought'' at the root of nature and at our root, poetry has always been there. Now a poem that most favorably opens the case for a renogotiation between the propositional and the nonpropositional thought is Wallace Stevens' ''Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction''. Fortunately it has repercussions for philosophical treatments of the questions involved too, witness the attention of Jean Wahl himself, from whom I borrow the nomenclature of propositional vs. nonpropositional.​[11]​ 

Stevens' poem opens realms that one could call cosmological, and does this in the light of a poetic inquiry into the existence and origin of certain primordial ''ideas'',  not presupposing beforehand what deserves being called an idea. With an unorthodox —not quite Romantic— naturalist inspiration, Stevens' poem draws conclusions from the fact that there was a time in the history of the earth, when humans who are able to think ideas did not exist as such. Thus his is a poetic genealogy of thinking, but also by implication, a fictional genealogy of matter thinking itself.

Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.

You must become an ignorant man again
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye
And see it clearly in the idea of it.

Never suppose an inventing mind as source
Of this idea nor for that mind compose
A voluminous master folded in his fire.

Starting by referring to ''the inconceivable idea of the sun'' and ruling out ''an inventing mind as source'' for it, Stevens's poem has a way of underscoring the saliences of objects and matter non-reducible to human thought, from within an engagement with this thought. Therefore the poem does not pursue the fact that sun as a physical system was a condition of possibility for all the minute irregularities and compromises responsible for the shape of humanity's existence. A mental flight of the mind which the contemporary paleontologist Neil Shubin is so good at making is not quite Stevens' way: ''...with bodies composed of particles derived from the birth of stellar bodies and containing organs shaped by the workings of planets...hard not to see home everywhere'' (Shubin).​[12]​ 

Instead, Stevens' poem turns to its own relation to this ''idea of the sun'' as a poem. Whereas Shubin is not talking about an idea when he situates the human in a vast domain of cosmologically ancestral conditions, Stevens' poem seems to cling to an operation immanent to ideas first, the only way it can turn toward its own limit: ''the poem refreshes life so that we share, / for a moment, the first idea...It satisfies// Belief in an immaculate beginning...'' The poem and its reflective medium is needed, insofar as it reactualizes the beginning through a relation to its own limit, which relation serves as a proxy for another relation Stevens evokes: ''life's nonsense pierces us with strange relation.'' The reactualization of the poem is a consequential acknowledgment by the human of the preexistent to human life, which is a nonsense for human thought, even while this affirmation has its place in the human life and its capacity to make fictions: ''the first idea was not our own...there was a muddy centre before we breathed. / There was a myth before the myth began, / venerable and articulate and complete''. 

Stevens' poem would not have the same force if it was merely about the sublime unthinkability of the preexistent to human; its challenge lies in the way it stresses the ambiguity between the myth before myth and myth; imagining the necessity of a language and intelligibility that is unhomely, but whose only key is given by a homelier logic which occludes it at the same time. Only by occluding its origins in clouds and sundriven transmutations of the earth, can human language affirm these origins, only in the  propositional (myth) a sense of the nonpropositional (myth before myth) that must have given birth to it, can be conceived. 

In other words, the poem gives a chance to propositional human thought to conceive and feel its own improbability: ''the poem, through candor, brings back a power again//that gives a candid kind to everything''. There is a way the propositional sprang and continues to spring from the nonpropositional, only making meaning by reanimating faint traces of this descendance and opening; or it can only reanimate these traces, when it is able to engage that limit and improbability at its origin and display that candor, in the relations it establishes. The result is a strange reversal: in a sense that leaves no room for idealist usurpation, the propositional accedes to its own —nonanthropomorphic— inclusiveness and openness to life's strange relation, and in a nonfinalist sense the nonpropositional starts to entertain a relation to its own determinacies—''venerable and articulate''— which must after all have ended up in the supposedly tidier orders and ideas of the propositional and human thought in general.

Stevens talks about a supreme fiction that must have been embedded in the generative yet articulate dynamics of the sun, the earth, and weather phenomena as ''ideas''. Seemingly indifferent, supremely indifferent events before the arrival of human ideas and conceptions, setting the ground for these conceptions too, without necessarily being for these conceptions' sake. Along the way a generalization of the idea of fiction also occurs, shifting from limited human prerogatives to a capacity shared with a host of material processes and relations.  

Changing the focus from a broken axis of emergences— myth before myth to myth— to this generalizing thrust itself, it is now possible to turn to Jean Wahl's own sense of the nonpropositional. Instead of opening up fiction's propositional provenance to dispute and corroding wonder, Wahl's own favored target is the idea of knowledge. What could be his ''notes toward a supreme knowledge'' are articulated apropos the French poet Paul Claudel:
''Knowledge is not for Claudel, something which characterizes the human; for him, as it is for diverse contemporary philosophers like Alexander, Whitehead, Heidegger, it is necessary to generalize the idea of knowledge. A color, ventures Claudel, knows its complementary color. And light knows the eye or resembles it…Moreover, there is a resemblance between that which sees and that which is seen..Thus knowledge is formation and information''.​[13]​
Wahl suggests a comparison between the cybernetic ideas of information of his day and the franchise Claudel gives to material processes for knowing. However, his understanding of information is not equivalent to a code or message separable from a process of material formation, in this echoing Gilbert Simondon's understanding of information. Bypassing the category of cause—often locked in the position of a Kantian category— and sidelining the primacy of the category of energy, (in)formation suggests itself as a mediation between nonpropositional knowing—that of the color's, the light's and the eye's— which, despite being thoroughly material, never mean indeterminate, and the propositional one formulable in human signs. In this fashion Wahl's knowledge echoes Stevens' fiction, which restores determinacy and proto-logical order to the clouds, the muddy center and the sun, and at the same time a non-idealist expansiveness to human fictions.

Commenting further, Wahl writes ''Knowledge is the registration of the real rapports existing between the things...Knowledge, it's the fact of completing oneself in extension: the sea knows the ship; the axe and oak both know the rock; the fire the food which it cooks, the metal which it smelts... we are within a universal relation where each thing knows the other'' (Wahl).​[14]​ Needless to say, Wahl's example of a fire knowing the food is far removed from the presupposition of a knowing in the image of a representing consciousness, witness the allusion placed in the well-chosen word, ''extension'', lifted from its Cartesian provenance and repurposed. Extension after all, even when taken in a Cartesian sense, is fully material.

Wahl thinks, the medium of this universal relation is a ''community of movement'', which he glosses with a poetic vision of a vast vibrational milieu, after the poet's own proclivities. Indeed Claudel is a great example of that phenomenon of an unencumbered intelligence finding hospitable ground in Catholicism:  ''It (vibration) is the very "element," the radical symbol that is the essential constituent of all life. The vibration of our brain is the bubbling of life's wellspring, the emotion of matter in contact with divine unity, whose ascendancy constitutes our very personality'' (Claudel).​[15]​ This comes down to envisioning the nonpropositional and propositional uniting, fanning out and differing as modes of vibration, which is like a proto-knowledge. Wahl's examples from Claudel, like Stevens' poem, are significant for the space they allow to relations and compositions maintained by strictly abiotic existents. A sense of vibrational constraint, the constraint of a tactile flickering, grounds knowledge as well as propositional thought. (When I think a thought of supreme fictions, I activate an inframolecular vibration that extends itself to complete itself in this thought.) Something of a resurrected alchemy which gives matter credit for thinking.

There have been other instances of this type of attribution, from Ernst Junger's visions of technology and chance (''Here in automatons a principle operative only in dreams—namely, that matter thinks—seemed to be realized''​[16]​ to Burroughs' metal and junk lines: ''sound of thinking metal''.​[17]​ Notably, a certain power of ''correspondence'' —instanced in the oscillatory links established by vibration— generally figures large in these attributions, in a way that anticipates Leo Bersani's recent foray into the nonpropositional in his germanely titled work Thoughts and Things. Just as Junger once proposed that in chance and good fortune, ''the things, the world itself thinks for us'',​[18]​ today one can find a form of correspondence like analogy being offered as a site of transaction between the propositional and nonpropositional: in analogy,  Bersani suggests, ''we can think like matter, or perhaps more accurately, matter thinks us''.​[19]​

To go back to the idea of knowledge, and a historical moment in which different ideas of information took on the task of establishing affinities between on the one hand the propositional and on the other material relations as different forms of thought, one can do worse than revisiting Gregory Bateson. In a work that intricately weaves logical principles with the workings of nature, Bateson wrote, ''what is my answer to the question of the nature of knowing? I surrender to the belief that my knowing is a small part of a  wider integrated knowing that knits the entire biosphere or creation''.​[20]​ What's even more significant is that the method, or the preparation of this envelopment of the propositional by the nonpropositional, also goes through a certain analogizing. In other words, as in Bersani, it is never the postulation of an unaccountable mystical union which embeds the propositional mind in nature and the natural tendencies of growth in the mind. 

As Bateson gives to understand, in his arguments he works to establish a certain balance between a Romantic dis-enclosure of thought driven by his personal beliefs, and a spirit of inquiry that answers to repeatability, if not literally objectivity. And this balance is struck by a method of ''creative comparisons'', which, rather than being an indifferent means to a goal, constitutes the goal in its mediality: ''From the manner of the search, we can read what sort of discovery the searcher may thereby reach'';​[21]​ by this account then, the creative comparison holds an implicit index to the ''wider integrated knowing'' which gives rise to the propositional knowing.






If there is a straightforward thesis to be offered around the main problem of this essay, it is that the identification of a nonpropositional thought requires and makes itself known by a certain defamiliarization of the traditional understanding of thought, and Elizabeth Wilson precisely makes a version of this move in her exploration of a possible thought carried out by the organism itself, within the context of what she calls a ''gut feminism''.​[22]​

As Wilson writes: ''My ambition is not to take notions of “thought” and “motive” as we commonly understand them (narrowly cognitive) and simply apply them to the biological domain. Rather, I am hoping to denaturalize our habitual definitions of these terms by associating them with hysterical materialization'' (56).​[23]​ In a reading of Sandor Ferenczi's unconventional perspective on bodily symptoms of hysteria, which takes them to be shifting somatic embodiments with a logic and psychism of their own, Wilson seems to find a possibility of generalization: ''The thinking that an organism enacts when its cognitive, rational, symbolizing structures have been destroyed should provide an opportunity to reconsider the nature of thinking in the usual sense. ...The vicissitudes of ingestion and vomiting are complex thinking enacted organically: bingeing and purging are the substrata themselves attempting to question, solve, control, calculate, protect, and destroy''.​[24]​ 

The consequences of the defamiliarizing extension that is the nonpropositional are very clear here. Here one is not only negating a disembodied perspective that fits a caricaturally banal, but partially truthful version of Descartes; not only the restrictive identification of thinking with cognitive problem solving is questioned, it is also suggested that what the organs like the throat and the stomach can do for us and on their own, may be forms of thinking as legitimate as step by step cognitive questioning, and problem solving: organic thought.  

In an interesting section from his Bubbles (of The Spheres trilogy) called ''Note on Oral Fundamentalism'', Peter Sloterdijk made a similar attempt to locate an organic dimension of nonpropositional thought. His specific extension of the concept of truth however, pivots not so much around phenomena of psychosomatic breakdown, as what he describes as modes of bodily ''absorption'' that include both everyday ingestings and attention to artistic forms (such as music). With a major difference from Wilson, who needs to adress Ferenczi's unfair marginalization in the local contexts of psychoanalysis and modern psychiatry, Sloterdijk bases his vision of ''absorptive truth'' on a relatively submerged but still substantive historical undercurrent in Western philosophy at large. Thus, Sloterdijk writes about a ''not entirely powerless tradition in European intellectual history that truth is something that cannot be articulated through speech let along writing, but only through singing, and most of all eating...''​[25]​

Against the background of a distinction that is turning out to be common in its various iterations, that between representative (propositional) and absorptive (nonpropositional) understandings of truth, Sloterdijk also postulates a latent sense of value inscribed within the absorptive: ''there are appropriate and inappropriate participations whose difference is akin to that between true and false''.​[26]​ Yet whereas what is appropriate in the representative regime of truth corresponds to truth in the usual sense, in absorptive truth organism itself is brought into question. Sloterdijk's example of a form of absorption that introduces untruth into the participatory economy of the body is the ingestion of poisons. Perhaps returning to Wilson's examples of abnormal regimes of consumption such as anorexia, one can raise the question of the status of concepts like health or pathology in a framework such as this.  

As if to confirm Sloterdijk's assertion about the not entirely powerless tradition, Georges Canguilhem lends his support to this possible point of view. In asking why ''no one ever wondered whether health were the truth of the body'', he suggested that ''truth is a logical value specific to the exercise of judgment. But there is another sense of truth — for which one need not turn to Heidegger. In Émilé Littré’s Dictionnaire de la langue française, an article titled “Truth” [Vérité] starts as follows: “Quality by which things appear such as they are.”​[27]​ It can be suggested that Canguilhem's meticulous analyses around relations between a life that gives rise to knowledge and a knowledge that takes life as its object only by finding its genesis in life, revolve around a similar insight. The organism has a capacity of formulating judgments and establishing norms, because it responds to environment in polarized ways which make certain relations more preferable instead of indifferent. It is hard to be indifferent to a poison after all. Thus organic judgment as polarization of response is antecedent to and guide those judgments established by propositional human values and knowledge.





The next stage of the rapprochement and all round recalibration pursued in this essay is a consideration of semiosis or symbolic activity at large. For a strategically informative case, the study looks at the work of the anthropologist Eduardo Kohn.
 
Kohn brings to his anthropological work a semiotic approach that radically qualifies the exceptional status of the human with regard to the reading and production of signs, or their employment in general. For him ''all life is semiotic and all semiosis is alive''.​[28]​ In this conviction Kohn is partly inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce's highly versatile generic scheme of ''representation'', which conceals implications for non-humans as well.

Kohn writes, ''representation is something both more general and more widely distributed than human language'' thereby recasting the usual role given to this term. What this essay means by the nonpropositional then corresponds to Kohn's unorthodox—guided by Peirce— use of the term ''representation'', whereas the propositional is human language and the specific symbol making capacities it involves. 

A foundational move for Kohn's intervention is one that is familiar now thanks to the previous discussion of Wilson on organism, which is a defamiliarization of what is usually understood by semiotic competence: ''The challenge is to defamiliarize the arbitrary sign whose peculiar properties are so natural to us because they seem to pervade everything that is in any way human and anything else about which humans can hope to know''.​[29]​ Kohn bases his approach on his ethnographic field work with Runa people and their specific relations to the forest where they dwell, noting how ''these relations amplify certain properties of the world, and this amplification can infect and affect our thinking about the world''. ​[30]​   

If the arbitary sign as the prerogative of the human is defamiliarized, admitting to a deep complicity with morphologies and expressions found in an ecosystem at large (whether plant or animal), Kohn seems to think, then one gains a foothold to adress ''what signs look like beyond the human'', thereby also scrambling the usual coordinates of the question ''what thinks?''. To Kohn's credit, he does not shy away from a problem that is as tricky as it is critical for any reflection on a thought beyond the human, namely the relation between human thought thereby set apart and the wider realm itself conceived as pregnant with signification and semiosis. After all, following a long lasting reflex, one could well respond to this problem with some narrative of human superiority and overcoming of immediacy, introducing hasty hierarchies and intimations of unilinear complexification. The problem is re-thinking the relations of precedence along with the tangly and messy coexistence between semiosis as such and human semiosis, without resorting to these familiar narratives. 

Like Wallace Stevens, Kohn does not believe in an absolute separation between human thought and the sign beyond the human, and by the same token the partition between the radically ancestral conditions of human thought and the novelty that is ushered in by it. Instead, he conceives the relation as an ''amplification'', a suggestive word for sure, implying both prolongation and qualitative/novelty-introducing change, without assuming the ''supersession'' of the nonhuman thought in human thought. Kohn puts the point thus: ''Are we forever trapped inside our linguistically and culturally mediated ways of thinking? My answer is no: a more complete understanding of representation [nonpropositional], which can account for the ways in which that exceptionally human kind of semiosis grows out of and is constantly in interplay with other kinds of more widely distributed representational modalities, can show us a more productive and analytically robust way out of this persistent dualism''.​[31]​ 

The merit of Kohn's attempt is that it certainly helps defamiliarize human semiotics. It is undisputably interesting and constitutes a vital provocation to think the belonging of human sign competence to a speculatively vaster realm of expression. However, along the way his account certainly creates other problems due to the extensiveness of his framework. In a great example of this extension, Kohn discusses the elongated snout of an anteater —thus a morphological characteristic— as a sign: ''a giant anteater is a sign, what it is—its particular configuration, the fact, for example, that it has an elongated, as opposed to some other shape of snout—cannot be understood without considering what it is about, namely, the relevant environment that it increasingly comes to fit through the dynamic I’ve just described'' .​[32]​ Thus a question arises whether Kohn's bid to defamiliarize requires or benefits by this attempt at redescription of evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, a burden of justification seems to emerge, concerning whether a semiotic framework may become a necessary and informative addition to the traditional description of the snout, which would be a language of evolution and organogenesis. Specifically the question would concern the nature of the relation between adaptation and semiotic surrogacy (whether this relation would be a complementarity or hierarchy, for instance). By dint of offering a reinscription of functional adaptation, Kohn's account perhaps raises the question of the benefit of this specific description, especially around an organ such as the human brain with its superimposed levels of functional adaptive ''signs'' and willingly deployed propositional signs in human language. 

Similarly one cannot but think that in the general reconfiguration of the relation between human symbolization (the propositional) and representation at large (the nonpropositional), there always remains an asymmetry, leaving one particular side harder to defend. The achievements of human thought in clarity can be pushed back toward a muddy center more easily than the venerable and articulate nature of the inhuman can be demonstrated, if not felt. When it comes to insisting on the proximity of human thought to ''the muddy center'', philosophers like Joanna Zylinska indeed think along the same lines as Kohn: ''Language does not so much attempt to (and fail to attempt to) capture life but rather enacts it, for us humans, in a certain way'' (Zylinska).​[33]​ It remains the case however, that the quotation marks around a ''thinking life'' is not to be undone wholesale outside the human. In this sense, the concept of amplification works with only a certain partial validity, by which amplification is necessarily judged from the point of view of the already ''amplified'' human with access to codified symbolization. 








Ontology between the Univocal and the Analogical 


The third stage of this tour around the natural historical grounds of logic and language takes as its particular field of play traditional ontological problems like being, becoming as well as the relation between being and nothingness. Let's note that rarely is there a requirement for this latter relation to resolve itself in simply oppositional or mutually exclusive terms. Instead, the most fruitful ontological contribution to the configuration of the relations between the propositional and the nonpropositional might be the co-appurtenance of being and nothingness, as we can see at least in two cases of this section. 

The three main interlocutors to be engaged here are Gilbert Simondon, Michael Marder and Leo Bersani. Each of these writers make innovative interventions around the question of the possible interfaces between thinking, matter and life; each grappling with the old chestnut of the identity of thought and being alla Parmenides; recalling with good reason that other famous appropriation of this philosophical scene of origin: ''Infinite movement is double, and there is only a fold from one to the other. It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be the one and the same...when Thales' thought leaps out, it comes back as water. When Heraclitus's thought becomes polemos, it is fire that retorts. It is a single speed on both sides...'' (Deleuze and Guattari).​[34]​

In a way that has been anticipated before, analogy has a key role to play in ontology's own treatment of the differences and relays between the propositional and the nonpropositional. Analogy here spreads the folds of being, creating zones of continuum between human thinking and processes of vital or material genesis. In a very precise sense, analogy absorbs the (onto)logical properties of what can otherwise well be called univocity, if this word really implies the following: ''being pure saying and pure event univocity brings in contact the inner surface of language... with the outer surface of Being...'' (Deleuze).​[35]​

Gilbert Simondon offers an exemplary case of an onto-logic that imparts the form of an analogical parity to the relation between nonpropositional events and propositional forms of human thought; and he does this apropos what he calls ''transduction''. Simondon defines this concept in the following way: ''an operation—physical, biological, mental, social—by which an activity propagates itself from one element to the next, within a given domain, and founds this propagation on a structuration of the domain that is realized from place to place''. Simondon's concept and the various uses he makes of it have a certain affinity with Wahl's poetic recasting of information as ''a fact of completing oneself in extension'' especially with reference to acts of vibrational propagation. For Simondon's transduction, the characteristic example is a process of crystallization however: ''A crystal that, from a very small seed, grows and expands in all directions in it supersaturated mother liquid provides the most simple image of the transductive operation: each already constituted molecular layer serves as an organizing basis for the layer currently being formed''.​[36]​ Thus for Simondon, a technical invention like assisted nuclear fission following from the seed of a simple insight into matter like the existence of isotopes, can serve as legitimate a case for transduction as crystallization. Analogy here is what establishes the dialogue between these different domains, assuming it corresponds to an ''identity of relations rather than a relation of identity'' and only this way backing the claim ''as it is in crystal, so it is in thought''.​[37]​

In effect, transduction becomes a polyvalently generic descriptor which straddles processes of generation in thought and being as one.​[38]​ In a passage that illustrates the broad field of applications and valences of his concept, and first and foremost its coupling between metaphysics and logic, Simondon writes, 

Transduction can be a vital operation; it expresses, in particular, the direction [sens] of the organic individuation; it can be a psychic operation and an effective logical procedure, even though it is not limited to logical thought. In the domain of knowledge, it defines the veritable process of invention, which is neither inductive nor deductive, but transductive, which means that it corresponds to a discovery of the dimensions according to which a problematic can be defined...it expresses individuation and allows it to be thought; it is therefore a notion that is both metaphysical and logical. It applies to ontogenesis, and is ontogenesis itself. (Simondon)
In this precise and technical terminology, which seems to encode a material dialectics without the primacy of negation as a motor, transduction works like a movable scheme for any operation and genesis that ends up in the existence of individuals, be it in the realm of living organisms, or forms of abiotic emergence like crystallization. Thus it ''expresses individuation and allows it to be thought'', being like the seed of an inborn objective intelligibility for a spectrum of domains between crystals and minds in linguistic communication in a collective. 

The emphases on ''expression'' with which Simondon ties transduction by making it ''express'' individuation, also endows it with a quality that approximates univocity in Deleuze's sense, insofar as this ''expression'' is never an arbitrary, or the form-imposing result of a mind that is single-handedly responsible for the intelligibility of material relations, or signification as such. Otherwise, ''the outer surface of being'', in Deleuze's words, would never find accomodation in this process of signification.

Instead, Simondon responds to ''the enigma of enigmas''​[39]​ of the relations between the knower and the known—and being and thought— by positing an original system of resonance and communication between individuation at large and individuation that is thinking in particular: ''it [transduction] is a functioning of the mind that discovers. This functioning consists of following being in its genesis, in carrying out the genesis of thought at the same time as the genesis of the object''.​[40]​ Giving ample scope to his associated engagements with ancient Greek sources of the enigma and its Parmenidean resolution, Simondon proposes a ''gain'' in epistemology without any concomitant ''loss'' in ontology. Whereas Canguilhem restores knowledge to life and life to knowing through ''polarization'', Simondon restores becoming to thinking and thinking to becoming through transduction. Along the way thought takes on a consistency that is almost quite physical, as if to rediscover its nonpropositional birth, and the genesis of the object accedes to a native impregnation with sense without the intelligibility lent by a subsequent idealist negation. Transduction communes with transduction without a levelling identification, across a divergence and suture that is beholden to an implicitly analogical operation. 

Particularly, analogy ensures that identification is never on the level of substance and even ''form of life'', as if to cancel any heterogeneity on its way, but takes place in terms of the modest but precise level of an iterated schema of relations. This condition brings us to the final stage of this extended inquiry, which is Leo Bersani's recent foray into cosmology and phylogenesis entitled ''Far Out''. 

In this essay, Bersani establishes what he calls ''correspondences'' between processes of heterogeneous scale like cosmological generation, the trajectory of human phylogenesis and finally the self-referential level of an analogical thought operation. In other words, his reflections have a parallel claim on that zone of complementarity between metaphysics and logic, if analogy is taken to be the legitimate logical procedure which it is. However, different from Simondon, for Bersani the establishment of a new tie between propositional human thought and nonpropositional existence has a very pointed temporal form: if analogy keeps alive the trace of the nonpropositional in the propositional, it does this because it enlivens a ''memory'' akin to a species memory. Bersani has more in common with Elizabeth Wilson in this regard, whose engagement with Ferenczi's unorthodox speculations also makes some emphasis on the presently felt phylogenetic traces shaping contemporary psychic economies. 

Naturally, one of the most striking aspects of these connections is the way analogy is singled out as a privileged delegate for the nonpropositional in the field of propositional human thought, bringing to mind Bateson's earlier specifications around ''method''. For Bersani, analogy simultaneously puts into play two different but obscurely interrelated scales of temporality, spanning at once a present ''in the making'' and the deep past of cosmology. The nascent and unfinished process of making analogies takes on a potentially cosmological import, putting implicit emphasis on a different sense of negativity: ''It is as if we were at the moment of similitudes just emerging—unfinished, unrealized'' (Bersani).​[41]​ As in Simondon, there is a way the negative is reconfigured to invest a process of material generation not from the side of a subsequent idealist standpoint, but from the side of whatever being found in statu nascendi. It refers to a state of being unfinished and ''toward'' without the finality of a state of arrival.

Bersani's provocative assertions about analogy in thought and being are outlined against such a background of assumptions.  Departing from the physicist Lawrence Krauss's statement that ''every atom in your body was once inside a star that exploded''​[42]​ and his accompanying bid to replace Christian myth with science, Bersani makes a series of vertical and vertiginous connections, linked step by step with each other:

To engage in this activity of positing uncertain alikeness is to expand the field of being. The relational is no longer constrained by the perhaps always illusory certitudes of similarity. In the specific case we have been looking at, the oddity lies not only in the unprovable yet possible status of a widespread religious myth as deriving from mnemonic traces of our cosmic origins, but also, and perhaps even more significantly, in the mental move that makes the connection (however lightly and in passing). The cosmological theory establishes our derivation from stellar at-oms, while the analogy between a savior’s death and the death of unimaginably ancient stars suggests the ease with which the human mind can, both in scientific theory and religious fable, articulate its affinity with the nonhuman. This affinity reverses Cartesian dogma: res cogitans corresponds ontologically with res extensa. Our connective field extends far beyond and before the human. We can think like matter, or perhaps more accurately, matter thinks us. To use like in this way invites a reformulation that dispenses with it. Alikeness is absorbed into a congruence, or community, of being.​[43]​






Thanks to its multiple tributaries in a new vision of organicism, ontology and semiotics the survey has reached a point where the bifurcation of the propositional and nonpropositional have been traversed from both directions: whereas loci like the organs, the muddy center of the sun, vibration as well as an anteater snout have been discussed in their capacities of articulacy, human thought itself has been caught out in the elusive avowals of  its ''far out'' kinship with stellar matter and transformations of the species. 

Especially in the second direction, analogy has played a determining role. Being a part of propositional human thought, analogy has also turned out to avow a sense and ''oddity'' that makes no sense for human propositional thought: that part in analogy which is like a jutting of ancestral cosmic matter. However, a host of other expressive categories may be equally suitable to carry out similar adjustments between the propositional and the nonpropositional. Some of these also enjoy a specific  proximity to poetic thought: mimesis, rhythm and gesture perhaps await their own eulogies for ''far out'' negotiation.   

One thing the essay has not considered is the information paradigm which similarly establishes a rapprochement between human languages and codes, and not-fully-human or nonpropositional structures like genes. In fact there is an influential lineage in biology and cybernetics for which the ''book of life'' still constitutes an illustrative trope, thereby offering a deceptive parallel with the target of this survey. For the reason of the anthropocentric and humanist underpinning of this trope however, which inevitably glamorizes the human decoding capacities, it has not been brought into the ambit of this discussion, which tried at least to take the nonreducibility of life and the nonpropositional more seriously.

These ideas have the merits of defamiliarizing human thought and checking the hubris attending any sense of the exceptional nature of human thinking, by showing it to be impregnated with the nonhuman. Moreover, differently from other theoretical evocations of a thinkable nonreducible to human thought, such as the one that is offered by Quentin Meillassoux's speculative realism, or Eugene Thacker's rehabilitations of mysticism, most of the examples discussed here allow a greater scope for a relation beyond relation which brings the nonhuman into the aesthetic presence of the human, with neither negating supersession, nor anthropomorphism. In fact, especially with respect to Meillassoux, instead of singling out the austerity of mathematical formalization as the only means of thought to register the traces of its obscurely and incommensurably ancestral conditions, the examples give a greater weight to poetry and the aesthetic at large. 
On the other hand however, there are also some insurmountable problems in completing the intuition of the community of the propositional and the the nonpropositional. First the necessity to preserve what is inassimilable to anthropomorphism, and next a wariness concerning a logic of resemblance insinuating itself to analogies dedicated to indexing a nonhuman thought, persistently create problems for envisioning a thought beyond the human. Relation can only be established beyond the relation, in the incompleteness of the intuition and the intuition of the incomplete.

In fact, one wonders whether —given a single-minded will to pursue the nonpropositional and carry it to its extreme conclusion— one may end up with a situation where abstract entities like truth and knowledge may get so much ''naturalized'' that nature ridden with so many ideas may need renaturalization in the image of an unthinking and mute mourning, a back and forth swing that may also include a re-idealization of ideas. At least, a necessary conclusion of these arguments is a sense that one cannot relativize the distinction between the propositional human thought and the physics of thinking inherent in the nonpropositional without simultaneously occluding the invention that human propositional thought constitutes. 
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